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Abstract  
This paper uses firm-level data to examine the impact of chemical safety regulations 
imposed by importing countries such as RoHS and REACH on the production costs 
and export performance of firms in Malaysia and Vietnam. We find that in addition 
to the initial setup costs for compliance, EU RoHS and REACH implementation 
causes firms to incur additional variable production costs by requiring additional 
labor and capital expenditures of around 12% of the variable costs, respectively. We 
also find that compliance with RoHS and REACH significantly increases the 
probability of export. Furthermore, we find that compliance with EU RoHS and 
REACH helps firms to penetrate into a greater variety of countries. Also, we find 
that multinational enterprises and firms participating in global value chains 
generally exhibit better export performance and their costs rise less steeply. 
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1. Introduction 
Various countries adopt technical regulations, including safety and performance 
requirements, to ensure consumer safety and product quality. At the same time, these 
regulations can constitute barriers to trade by imposing compliance costs on firms. There 
has been a great deal of study focusing on the effect of regulations on producer 
performance in export and production in the agricultural sectors. The majority of these 
studies have found that the safety requirements tend to reduce exports, particularly those 
from developing countries (see, for example, Otsuki et al. (2001)). Research on the effect of 
technical regulations on manufacturing exports, however, has been limited. Chen et al. 
(2008) examined the effect of quality, safety standards, and labeling requirements on the 
export performance of the manufacturing firms of 16 developing countries using firm-level 
survey data. Using the same dataset, Maskus et al. (2013) investigated the effects of 
technical regulations on variable costs. The results of these studies generally imply that 
technical regulations can increase exports even as they impose additional variable cost on 
firms. While the dataset used in these studies covers a global set of developing countries, it 
does not cover East Asian countries. In addition, the number of samples for individual 
countries is not large enough to conduct detailed analysis of a single country. 
Our study attempts to examine the effect of technical regulations on the 
performance of manufacturing firms in Malaysia and Vietnam with respect to both export 
and production by using a new survey dataset. This study focuses on two sets of technical 
regulations targeting consumer and environmental safety in the EU: the Restriction of 
Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive and the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). The EU RoHS Directive (Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on restriction of the use of certain hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment) was implemented in 20061. This directive 
restricts the amount of hazardous substances allowed in electronic and electrical (E&E) 
equipment. The EU REACH Regulations (Regulation of the European Parliament and 
                                                 
1  The regulated substances are lead, mercury, cadmium, polybrominated biphenyls, and polybrominated 
diphenyl ethers. 
Council concerning Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals) 
was implemented in 2007 and regulates the use in products of chemical substances that 
cause serious concern for consumer health and the environment. Under REACH, if a 
product contains chemicals classified as SVHCs (Substances of Very High Concern) in 
excess of 0.1% by weight, firms are required to notify the European regulatory body, the 
European Chemicals Agency, for authorization.  
Once the chemicals contained in a final product are regulated, the materials, parts 
and components composing the final product need to be redesigned, monitored, tested and 
proved to meet the stipulated chemical thresholds. Because parts and components suppliers 
are often located across borders, supply chain/value chain/production network management 
takes place across firms, industries, and countries. To make the adaptation even more 
complex, the impact of product-related environmental regulations that regulate chemicals 
are spread over various industries. Industries affected by REACH and RoHS include not 
only the chemical industry, but also the textiles, garment, wood products, plastic, rubber, 
machinery, and E&E industries, among others. Potentially affected industries are often 
located in developing countries, with those aiming at exporting to EU markets most 
affected.  
Malaysia and Vietnam are rapidly industrializing countries in East Asia, and 
manufacturing exports have become an increasingly important engine of export-led growth 
for these countries. At the same time, these countries have faced increasing pressure from 
importing countries, and in particular from developed countries, to meet safety and quality 
requirements. Although RoHS and REACH are only EU requirements, meeting those 
requirements may also signal superior safety and quality. Compliance with these standards 
may therefore help a firm to enter non-EU markets. Our study addresses the effect of these 
regulations on the export performance and cost effectiveness of firms to provide a complete 
picture of the effects. Although production costs may increase, exports may do so as well. 
The empirical results will then allow us to determine whether these requirements have a 
positive or negative net effect on firms by assessing which effect is dominant. 
For export analysis, we employ a probit model to examine the effect of RoHS and 
REACH on firm entry into the export market. We also employ an ordered probit model to 
examine the standards’ effects on the number of export markets. We also analyze their 
effect on average exports per market for firms. In the production analysis, we evaluate an 
increase in variable costs due to RoHS and REACH compliance by using an estimation of a 
translog cost function.  
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
backgrounds of Malaysia and Vietnam in terms of export performance and technical 
regulations. Section 3 explains the empirical approaches used in our analyses. Section 4 
presents and interprets the results of these analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Export performance of Malaysia and Vietnam 
Exports of goods from Malaysia and Vietnam have grown rapidly during the past 
two decades, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Malaysia has been a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member since 1995, and Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007. Although Malaysia is a 
larger exporter than Vietnam, exports from both countries have been increasing rapidly. 
This is especially true for manufactured goods, where growth has been relatively higher 
than that of exports of agricultural products. Figure 2 clearly shows the positive impact of 
WTO membership on Vietnam’s exports. Both figures illustrate the recovery from the 
financial crisis and continued increase in exports. Our data show that 70% and 74% of 
sampled firms in Malaysia and Vietnam, respectively, exported their products. 
Vu et al. (2014) found rapid growth in the number of both domestic firms and 
multinational enterprises in Vietnam since 2000. Increased foreign direct investment and 
export has led to greater pressure on firms in Malaysia and Vietnam to comply with safety 
and quality regulations. After the introduction of the RoHS Directive, an increasing number 
of countries have implemented their own RoHS standards. Vietnam introduced its version 
of RoHS in September 2011. Malaysia also has a long history of regulation of hazardous 
chemicals. This implies that firms in Malaysia and Vietnam are quite aware of the 
importance of regulations on hazardous chemicals. Among respondent firms in Malaysian 
and Vietnam, 81% and 88%, respectively, had achieved compliance with RoHS by 2011; 
additionally, 70% (in Malaysia) and 87% (in Vietnam) had achieved compliance with 
REACH by 2011.  
2.2 Related literature 
Producers in developing countries face capacity constraints when complying with 
food safety and quality standards, typically in developed countries. Its significance is yet to 
be clear since firm-level quantitative studies on technical regulations are very limited, and 
even more so when it comes to developing countries.  
On the other hand, country-level empirical studies that examine the effect of 
technical regulations on trade are relatively abundant, predominantly in the food and 
agricultural sectors. Otsuki et al. (2001a) showed that EU’s aflatoxin standards discouraged 
African groundnut exports to the EU using a gravity model. A majority of studies of this 
kind have found negative effects of food safety standards (see, for example, Otsuki et al. 
(2001a), Wilson et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2008), Drogué and DeMaria (2012), and 
Winchester et al. (2012)). Honda (2012) is one of the few studies focusing on the 
manufacturing sector. He applied a gravity model to examine the effect of EU’s RoHS on 
exports to the EU market from EU and non-EU countries. He found that RoHS promoted 
intra-EU trade, but destructed exports from non-EU countries. Unlike the other country-
level studies, Xiong and Beghin (2013) tried to isolate the positive demand-enhancing 
effect of food safety standards from the negative trade-cost effect using a more 
sophisticated gravity model.  
In contrast, there are a relatively smaller number of firm-level studies. Wilson and 
Otsuki (2004) tried to describe the benefits and difficulties that technical regulations bring 
to firms in developing countries using the World Bank’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Survey Database. They showed that approximately 70 percent of the surveyed firms in 
various industries in 17 developing countries claimed that the costs of testing and 
certification are likely to prevent them from exporting to major developed country markets. 
At the same time, approximately 80 percent of the surveyed firms claimed that assurance of 
product quality and safety is important for expanding their exports. Firms try to comply 
with the technical regulations in a variety of ways – by expanding their plant or equipment, 
re-designing products, and hiring labor for production and testing.  
Using the above mentioned database, Maskus et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2008) 
developed methodological techniques to analyze the effect of technical requisitions using 
firm-level data. Using a translog cost function, Maskus et al. (2013) estimated whether the 
presence of technical regulations can increase firms’ recurring variable production cost in 
addition to the initial setup costs. Chen et al. (2008) estimated firm-level export functions 
of intensive and extensive margins. They identified the factors that increase the amount of 
exports in firm’s total sales (intensive margin), and the number of export markets and 
products that are exported (extensive margin). Compliance with quality standards was 
found to increase the export amount, as well as the number of export markets and products 
exported. On the contrary, standard certification procedures are found to reduce the number 
of export markets and products exported. 
Ragasa et al. (2011) also supports the cost augmenting effect of technical 
regulations. They found that the US hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) 
standard incurred significant additional production cost to the firms in the seafood industry 
in the Philippines. There are several studies supporting the demand-enhancing effect of 
compliance with technical regulations. Maertens and Swinnen (2008) pointed out that 
developed countries’ stringent food safety standards do not always discourage developing 
country firms. Maertens and Swinnen (2009), and Maertens et al. (2011) demonstrated 
through a case study of Senegal’s fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, that compliance 
with food safety standards in developed countries can increase developing country exports 
to developed countries which appreciate high-quality products. Maertens et al. (2011) also 
pointed out the importance of the role of multinational enterprises in improving product 
quality and safety as leaders in the supply chain of food products. Fontagné et al. (2013) 
examined the effect of SPS standards on firm’s probability to export (extensive margin), 
value of exports (intensive margin) and export prices using firm-level data for French 
agricultural and manufacturing firms.  
 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Estimating the effect of RoHS and REACH on production costs 
Compliance with technical regulations entails various costs to firms. Maskus et al. 
(2013) distinguished between initial setup costs and running costs of complying with 
technical regulations. Although firms can be asked directly about their initial setup costs, 
they often cannot give an exact amount, especially if many years have passed since they 
first complied with the regulations. The additional running costs associated with regulations 
affect the persistence and amount of exports because these costs reduce profit margins. We 
therefore follow the approach of Maskus et al. (2013) to cost function estimation and use a 
translog cost function, which is flexible and can incorporate non-price variables such as 
factors for technical regulations.  
 Assume a short-run cost function 
  ),;,( zsywCC  ,       (1) 
where w is a vector of factor prices, y is output, s indicates the stringency of the foreign 
standard, and z is a vector of other variables affecting firm-level costs. The firm minimizes 
variable costs wx, where x is the vector of variable inputs. The cost function is assumed to 
have some standard properties: non-decreasing in w and y, concave in w, and homogeneous 
of degree one with respect to w. This general cost function has a variable for technical 
regulations, s, as an argument because different technical regulations should affect the 
choice of inputs for producing a given output level. Maskus et al. (2013) used initial setup 
costs for technical regulations as a measure of the stringency of technical regulations, but 
we use a dummy variable indicating compliance with RoHS or REACH because of a lack 
of data about setup costs associated with these regulations.  
We assume that the cost function is weakly separable from the aggregator for 
material inputs and other inputs (separability). The separability assumption is necessary 
because we do not have data on the prices of materials and other inputs. We therefore 
specify equation (1) as the cost of producing net output, or value added, introducing only 
labor and capital as variable inputs, obtaining weak separability in this instance. This 
implies that the choice of relative labor and capital inputs is independent of material and 
intermediate input prices.2 As a result, the cost function that reflects this technology is 
rewritten as 
)),;,(),,;,((),;,( 2211 zswyCzswyCzsywC  ,     (2) 
where ),{1 KL www  and 2w is the vector of prices for variable inputs other than labor and 
capital. These subcomponents of the overall cost function are assumed to be homogeneous 
of degree one in w1 and w2, as appropriate, to be consistent with the linear homogeneity of 
C in w. Separating the cost function allows us to ensure that the elasticity of cost (value 
added) with respect to our technical regulation variables derived from the first component 
(C1) is unaffected by the presence of the second component (C2). This cost elasticity can be 
written as3 
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Our specification of a short-run variable cost is a translog function. This translog 
function allows a flexible second-order approximation to a cost structure depending on 
output, input prices, and other factors, including technical regulations. We also instrument 
the binary variable for technical regulations due to its possible endogeneity (a firm with 
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greater efficiency or lower costs is more likely to export, and is thus more likely to be 
subject to foreign technical regulations). This allows us to treat that variable as continuous 
because the predicted value from the first-stage regression is used instead of binary values. 
The specification of costs for firm i is as follows. 
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(4) 
where C  denotes value added (cost of labor and capital, referred to as production costs 
hereafter), wL denotes the wage rate, wK denotes the unit price of capital, y denotes sales as 
a measure of output, and s denotes the firm-specific measure of technical regulations. The 
variables zn and zc denote industry-specific and country-specific factors, respectively, that 
affect firm costs. We use industry and country dummies to control for these effects.   
This translog cost function is estimated jointly with an equation for the share of 
labor cost in production costs: 
ln ln lnLi L LL Li LK Ki Ly i Ls i iS w w y s           .   (5) 
We eliminate the capital-share equation from the estimation because it is fully determined 
by the constraints below.   
Note that in writing these equations we have imposed the required symmetry in 
cross-variable coefficients. Furthermore, the linear homogeneity condition imposes the 
following constraints: 
1 KL   
0 LKKK          (6) 
0 LKLL   
0 KyyL   
0 KsLs   
Equations (4) and (5) are estimated jointly in an iterative three-stage least squares 
procedure (I3SLS), subject to the constraints in the system of equations (6). In addition to 
consistency and asymptotic efficiency, the I3SLS procedure guarantees identical translog 
cost parameters irrespective of which share equation is dropped (Berndt and Wood, 1975). 
The parameters for the dropped equation can be recovered by using the symmetry condition 
and the conditions in the system of equations (6). 
From equation (4), we can calculate the direct elasticity of production costs with 
respect to foreign standards as lnds s ss is    , which varies with the level of technical 
regulations. We are also interested in the impact of the standards on factor demands. The 
coefficient Ls  in the system of equations (6) measures the bias toward labor use (impact 
on labor share) from an increase in foreign technical regulations ( lnLs L LsS s     ), 
and the bias toward capital use, ( lnKs K KsS s     ). The need to meet these technical 
regulations could effectively generate an overall increase in costs, along with a bias in 
factor use toward either labor or capital.   
In addition to the direct elasticity of cost, we can calculate the total elasticity of cost 
with respect to a change in the stringency of technical regulations while accounting for 
impacts on factor use, as 
sCS ln
~ln   =  iysKiKsLiLsisss ywws lnlnlnln   . (7) 
This elasticity will vary with different observations on factor prices and output. Likewise, 
we can calculate the total elasticity of scale as 
yCy ln
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Finally, the Allen partial elasticities of substitution between inputs i and j ( ij ) are 
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3.2. Estimation of the effect of RoHS and REACH on export performance 
We now move to the estimation approach for the effect of technical regulations on 
various measures of export performance of firms, namely the firm’s entry into export 
markets, the number of export markets, and export amount.  
We begin by considering the firm’s entry into export markets. A binary variable is 
given the value one when the firm exports to at least one foreign country and zero 
otherwise. A probit model is used to estimate the effect of technical regulations, s, along 
with other regressors. We then focus on the number of export markets as a measure of 
export diversification (we refer to this as the extensive margin in keeping with the 
literature). This model allows us to examine whether meeting RoHS or REACH will offer 
opportunities for the firm to export to a greater variety of export markets. An ordered probit 
model is used for this estimation because we deal with an ordered dependent variable. We 
focus on the amount of a firm’s exports as a measure of the magnitude of exports instead of 
entry or count of markets to capture the intensity of exports (we refer to this as the intensive 
margin). Since the ordered probit estimation addresses market diversification, a 
complementary measure of export intensity would be the average export amount per market 
instead of the total export amount. The total amount reflects both the extensive and 
intensive margins. It is also common in the literature to estimate the intensive margin 
model using the Heckman sample selection model with taking the sample selection into 
account. This sample selection is represented by the above probit model corresponding to 
the extensive margin, as is typical.  
 
4. Data 
4.1. Survey in Malaysia 
The data for Malaysia was collected in Penang, Malaysia from 2012 to 20134. 
Penang was chosen because of the large agglomeration of industries, with many of the 
targeted firms located in the area. The project was also endorsed by the government of 
Penang, as the state government recognized the importance of the issue. The actual survey 
was conducted by PE Research of Malaysia.  
Our questionnaire comprised four sections: 1) basic information, 2) input 
procurement and certificates, 3) chemical management, and 4) export status. Surveyed 
firms were sampled from those firms recorded in the Penang Industrial Census of 2011, 
which collected data on 2,116 firms, of which 1,898 were manufacturers and 218 were 
service firms. Beginning in November, 2012, we contacted 732 of these firms by 
distributing questionnaire sheets and following up with phone calls. We received replies 
from 374 firms, giving us a response rate of approximately 51% 5 . Among the 
manufacturing industries 346 were chosen, and 23 firms were chosen from the service 
sectors. We targeted those sectors for which the management of chemicals contained in 
products was likely to be necessary. The share of small and medium enterprises, here 
defined as fewer than 200 employees, was 83.4%, or 308 of the chosen firms. Among the 
chosen firms, 72.6% (268) were 100% locally owned, and 18.7% (69) firms were 100% 
                                                 
4 The data were collected under the IDE-JETRO research project “Impact of product-related environmental 
regulations on international trade and technological spillovers through supply chain in Asia”.  
5  The authors wish to thank the local governments, Invest Penang and Penang industrial associations, 
Federation of Malaysian manufacturers (FMM) in the Northern Region and the association of companies in 
the free zones (FREPENCA) for endorsing our research project and also those firms who kindly filled out our 
form. 
foreign-owned firms; the remaining 32 firms were joint ventures between local and foreign 
owners. 
4.2. Survey in Vietnam 
The data for Vietnam were collected from the entire country in 2011 to 2012. In 
Vietnam the survey was implemented by the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. The population consists of firms in operation according to the General 
Department of Taxation. Target firms include both those in manufacturing and those in 
commerce sectors where the management of chemicals in products is an issue. Of the 
15,358 firms in the population, survey forms were sent to 11,978 firms across all provinces. 
A response rate of 8.8% (1055 firms) was obtained. Domestic firms account for 67.4% of 
respondents (710 firms), foreign direct investment (FDI) firms account for 31.8% of 
respondents (335 firms), and state-owned enterprises account for 0.9% of respondents (9 
firms). Among respondents, 57.6% were small and medium enterprises, here those with 
fewer than 300 employees.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The survey focuses on a variety of industries in Malaysia and Vietnam. The 
industries studied and the count of firms can be found in Table 1. Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cost and export analyses. First, we will 
describe the variables used in the cost analysis. The average value added cost and sales are 
greater in Vietnam than in Malaysia, but the standard deviations of these variables are 
smaller in Malaysia. This implies that firms are more diverse in terms of the size of 
operation in Vietnam. In Malaysia, we find that the wage rate and unit price of capital are 
higher. We define global value chains as the networks of firms that procure inputs from 
various countries and sell the products globally, such as automotive products, electronics, 
and garments. Firms were asked whether they supplied their main products to global supply 
chains. In Malaysia, more firms were integrated into global value chains. The number of 
firms complying with RoHS and REACH is also far greater in Malaysia. The survey also 
asked firms if they were able to meet EU RoHS and REACH standards along with other 
regulations and requirements.6 
We next describe the variables used in the export analysis that were not used in the 
cost analysis. The fraction of firms exporting to any foreign country is quite close between 
Malaysia (69%) and Vietnam (62%). However, the fraction of firms exporting to EU 
countries is greater in Vietnam (34%) than in Malaysia (25%). The average export amount 
per market in Malaysia is twice that in Vietnam. The number of years since the firm was 
established is greater in Malaysia, perhaps reflecting the earlier economic growth and 
industrialization of Malaysia. The number of employees follows the same tendency as cost 
and sales: Malaysia has a greater average size and a smaller variation. The fraction of 
multinational enterprises is greater in Vietnam. The number of years since the firm’s main 
product was first produced is used for the exclusion restriction in the Heckman sample 
selection model.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Cost function estimation 
The cost function was run jointly with the labor share equation under alternative 
specifications. Instrumental variables were used for RoHS and REACH to mitigate the 
effects of endogeneity. These variables include dummies for export, being a multinational 
enterprise, and being in a global value chain. The parameter estimates with respect to 
translog models are presented in Table 3. For the sake of comparison, we also show the 
parameters estimated by the Cobb–Douglas functional form. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The “translog I” model follows a specification without interaction 
terms with RoHS (or REACH); the “translog II” follows the full translog specification. All 
equations include industry and country fixed effects. The fit of each model is good with 
adjusted R-squared coefficients of 0.8 or greater. We examine local concavity in input 
prices and positivity of input shares for the translog model according to procedures 
                                                 
6 We assume that non-response implies non-compliance so as to conserve a loss of samples due to missing 
data. 
described by Berndt and Wood (1975). Our fully specified translog cost functions were 
found to satisfy these conditions.  
The results of the Cobb–Douglas model estimation show that the coefficients for 
RoHS and REACH are both statistically insignificant. However, the Cobb-Douglas 
specification may be too simple to represent the underlying technology. In the translog 
models (translog I and translog II), the coefficients for the (linear) RoHS and REACH 
variables are positive and significant in both specifications. This indicates that the direct 
effect of RoHS and REACH is significant and indicates increased variable production cost. 
The coefficients for the quadratic RoHS and REACH are not significant. According to the 
translog I model, cost increases due to RoHS and REACH are 12.5% and 12.7% of total 
(labor and capital) costs, respectively.  
When we take the indirect costs of technical regulations into account in translog II 
model according to equation (5), the cost increases due to RoHS and REACH are 11.5% 
and 12.0%, respectively, although the effect of REACH is not significant (see Table 5). The 
effects of RoHS and REACH may not be particularly large, but the result suggests that the 
payoffs for compliance in terms of increased price and improved access to foreign markets 
should be greater than around 12%.  
When we consider that our estimate concerns only labor and capital costs, we find 
that additional cost variables may be necessary. These could include cost of raw materials, 
intermediate inputs and other costs. Firms have also already incurred the initial setup costs 
for compliance with these regulations. We therefore see that the costs associated with 
RoHS and REACH compliance appear to be nontrivial.  
The effect of participating in a global value chain seems to reduce firm’s variable 
costs because the coefficients for the global value chains dummy are negative and 
significant in both RoHS and REACH cases. Firms can therefore expect some cost-saving 
effect from participating in global value chains, although there may be some correlation 
between firm efficiency and tendency to participate in the global value chains. 
Finally, we examine robustness of the results of the cost function estimation using 
the sub-sample which belongs to the industries facing RoHS or REACH regulations. The 
industries facing RoHS and REACH are indicated in Table 1. The results are presented in 
Table 4. The significance levels and magnitudes of the estimated parameters are largely 
unchanged from the full-sample results in Table 3. The direct effect of RoHS and REACH 
compliance in terms of cost increase is 12% as is the case of the full-sample estimation in 
both translog I and II models. The indirect effect calculated from translog II model is also 
around the same order although the results are not presented. Thus, the full-sample results 
are considered to be reasonably robust.  
5.2. Export estimation 
In the export analysis, we focused on the firm’s entry to export markets, the number 
of export markets, and the export amount. The results for RoHS and REACH are presented 
in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. The first and second columns of these tables show the 
results of the probit regression used to examine whether compliance with RoHS and 
REACH improves the firm’s ability to access, respectively, foreign markets generally and 
the EU market specifically. The results indicate that RoHS does not increase the probability 
of entering foreign markets in general, but that it does increase the probability of entering 
the EU markets. In the case of REACH, it increases probability to enter both export 
markets in general and the EU market. 
The third column of these tables shows the results of the ordered probit estimation. 
We find that compliance with RoHS and REACH significantly increases the number of 
export markets. We can therefore conclude that compliance with RoHS and REACH helps 
firms to access a greater variety of countries. Thus, compliance with RoHS and REACH 
seems to signal safety and quality of the products of the firms and to help the products to be 
accepted in the other markets. However, one should be cautious about the exception that the 
effect of compliance with RoHS on the probability to export is not significant. This is 
perhaps because the effect of compliance with RoHS is not homogeneous across export 
markets. There may be a group of countries which highly appreciate RoHS compliance, and 
therefore the firms in our sample were able to export to multiple countries within this group, 
most likely the EU countries. On the other hand, there may be a considerable number of 
countries that do not appreciate compliance with EU-specific RoHS very much, resulting in 
the statistical insignificance of the effect of RoHS compliance on the probability to export.  
The fourth and fifth columns of these tables show the results of a Heckman sample 
selection estimation examining the effect of compliance with RoHS and REACH on the 
average amount exported per market as a measure of the intensive margin.7 The results 
indicate that the average export amount per export market does not significantly increase 
with compliance with RoHS or REACH. Thus, the major benefit of RoHS and REACH 
compliance remains to be diversification of export markets instead of an increase of export 
amount.  
Multinational enterprises exhibit a greater probability to export, diversity in export 
markets and the scale of export according to Tables 6 and 7, confirming our expectation 
that multinational enterprises tend to possess superior technological knowledge and greater 
expertise in export procedures than local firms. Also, participation in global value chain are 
found to increase export probability and diversity in export markets. However, it does not 
affect the scale of export perhaps because the major role of global value chain is to assist 
firms to penetrate into markets through quality assurance accomplished by the value chain.  
We also examine robustness of the full-sample results of the export analysis using 
the sub-sample of firms in the industries facing RoHS and REACH as has been done in the 
cost analysis. The results are largely the same as those of the full-sample estimation.  
Overall, compliance with RoHS and REACH provides firms with better access to 
export markets but the advantage of a compliance with RoHS is likely to be found in 
accessing the EU market. This may indicate that EU REACH is more universal than EU 
RoHS. However, this finding seems to contradict our observations that RoHS-type 
regulations are more widely adopted worldwide than REACH-type regulations. Thus, 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the inverse mills ratios are insignificant in both tables, implying that sample selection 
is not severe enough to cause the biased coefficient estimators.    
detailed investigation about dissimilarity of these regulations across countries would be 
necessary. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper uses firm-level data to examine the impact of foreign chemical safety 
regulations such as RoHS and REACH on the production costs and export performance of 
firms in Malaysia and Vietnam. We find that in addition to the initial setup costs for 
compliance, EU RoHS and REACH implementation causes firms to incur additional 
variable production costs by requiring additional labor and capital expenditures of around 
12% of the variable costs, respectively. We also find that compliance with RoHS and 
REACH significantly increases the probability of export, but that compliance with RoHS 
only increases the probability of export to the EU. Furthermore, we find that compliance 
with EU RoHS and REACH helps firms to penetrate into a greater variety of countries. On 
the other hand, the effect of RoHS and REACH compliance on the average export amount 
per market is not found. Also, we find that multinational enterprises and firms participating 
in global value chains generally face less production costs and exhibit better export 
performance. 
In summary, RoHS and REACH cause firms to incur both initial setup costs and 
additional variable production costs. Compliance with these regulations can, however, 
reward firms with improved access to a greater number of export markets. The benefits of 
compliance may therefore exceed the additional costs although a direct comparison is not 
pursued in this paper due to the difference in the nature of the performance measures. 
Further investigation that focuses on dissimilarity of RoHS- and REACH-types of chemical 
safety regulations across countries, in particular, between the EU and non-EU countries 
would be necessary to make useful prescription for both exporting firms and regulating 
countries so as to avoid these technical regulations to constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade. Effort to harmonise regulations globally may increase economic benefits if they aim 
to achieve the same public goals and if cross-country dissimilarity of regulations are not 
significant.  
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Figure 1.  Malaysia's Exports (in billions of USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators data 
 
Figure 2.  Vietnam's Exports (in billions of USD) 
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Table 1. Industries included in the analysis 
Table 1. Industries included in the analysis 
 
Number 
of firms RoHS REACH
Food products 51   
Beverages 7   
Textiles 25 x x 
Wearing apparel 113 x x 
Leather and related products 9 x x 
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture, 48 x x 
Paper and paper products 9 x x 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 10 x x 
Coke and refined petroleum products 2 x x 
Chemicals and chemical products 17 x x 
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparation 2 x x 
Rubber and plastics products 51 x x 
Other non-metallic mineral products 10 x x 
Basic metals 26 x x 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 43 x x 
Computer, electronic and optical products 23 x x 
Electrical equipment 17 x x 
Machinery equipment 19 x x 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5  x 
Other transport equipment 6  x 
Furniture 21 x x 
Other manufacturing 60 x x 
Wholesale and retail trade, and repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment including motor vehicles and motor-cycles 11   
Others 50   
Source: Malaysia and Vietnam firm surveys. These counts are for the responses used in the empirical analyses. 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
  Malaysia   Vietnam  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Cost analysis  
Value added cost (million USD) 220 15.9 36.5 391 30.6 50.0
Sales (million USD) 220 23.7 50.0 391 51.2 75.4
Wage rate (USD) 220 7129.4 8180.3 391 3416.6 11558.5
Unit capital price (USD) 220 3.389 5.466 391 1.446 2.639
Participation in global value 
chain 
220 0.518 0.501 391 0.202 0.402
RoHS compliance 220 0.341 0.475 391 0.082 0.274
REACH compliance 220 0.241 0.429 391 0.082 0.274
Export analysis       
Entry to export market 220 0.686 0.465 391 0.619 0.486
Entry to EU market 220 0.250 0.434 391 0.338 0.473
Number of export markets 220 2.700 2.609 391 1.637 2.009
Average export per export market 
(million USD) 
154 53.4 17.0 217 23.8 42.5
Number of years since the firm 
was established 
220 19.568 12.747 358 10.447 9.658
Number of employees 220 151.11 286.0 391 475.96 1063.19
Multinational enterprise 220 0.218 0.414 391 0.281 0.450
Number of years since the main 
product was first produced 
220 16.177 11.706 372 9.312 8.065
Source: The authors’ calculations from Malaysia and Vietnam firm survey data.
Table 3. Cost function estimation (full sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RoHS REACH  
Variables Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II 
       
Constant 0.403 9.259*** 9.106*** 0.604*** 9.609*** 8.908*** 
 (0.280) (1.863) (1.922) (0.213) (1.712) (1.769) 
logy 0.963*** 0.0112 0.0642 0.945*** -0.0439 0.0751 
(0.0242) (0.248) (0.257) (0.0183) (0.230) (0.240) 
(logy)2 0.0350** 0.0278  0.0412*** 0.0309* 
(0.0165) (0.0171)  (0.0154) (0.0163) 
logwL -0.0404*** -0.0345 -0.0939 -0.0411*** -0.0291 -0.0616 
(0.0129) (0.0591) (0.0607) (0.0137) (0.0587) (0.0607) 
logwK 0.122*** 1.035*** 1.094*** 0.122*** 1.029*** 1.062*** 
(0.00943) (0.0591) (0.0607) (0.0102) (0.0587) (0.0607) 
(logwL)2 0.0666*** 0.0666***  0.0640*** 0.0639*** 
(0.00254) (0.00252)  (0.00249) (0.00249) 
(logwK)2 0.0666*** 0.0666***  0.0640*** 0.0639*** 
(0.00254) (0.00252)  (0.00249) (0.00249) 
logwLlogwK -0.0666*** -0.0666***  -0.0640*** -0.0639*** 
(0.00254) (0.00252)  (0.00249) (0.00249) 
logwLlogy -0.0146*** -0.00921**  -0.0133*** -0.0104*** 
(0.00355) (0.00383)  (0.00352) (0.00381) 
logwKlogy  0.0146*** 0.00921**  0.0133*** 0.0104*** 
(0.00355) (0.00383)  (0.00352) (0.00381) 
s (= RoHS -1.024 12.46*** 12.33*** -0.371 12.72*** 12.34*** 
or REACH) (0.823) (1.801) (1.868) (0.594) (1.102) (1.165) 
s2 0.214    1.345 
 (1.010)    (1.488) 
s* logwL -0.115***  -0.0725** 
(0.0325)  (0.0362) 
s* logwK 0.115***  0.0725** 
(0.0325)  (0.0362) 
s* logy 0.0644***  0.0405** 
 (0.0183)  (0.0202) 
Global value 0.182 -2.177*** -2.190*** 0.0664 -2.214*** -2.257*** 
chain (0.150) (0.331) (0.332) (0.111) (0.212) (0.215) 
Malaysia   -1.997*** -2.000***   -1.197*** -1.202*** 
dummy  (0.248) (0.249)   (0.119) (0.119) 
       
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
R-squared 0.962 0.801 0.800 0.961 0.825 0.825 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table 4. Cost function estimation (sub-sample: firms subject to RoHS/REACH) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RoHS REACH  
Variables Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II 
       
Constant 0.491 7.631*** 7.274*** 0.743*** 7.799*** 6.619*** 
 (0.300) (2.021) (2.113) (0.231) (1.849) (1.922) 
logy 0.965*** 0.237 0.325 0.938*** 0.190 0.389 
(0.0253) (0.268) (0.283) (0.0189) (0.247) (0.261) 
(logy)2 0.0218 0.0111  0.0259 0.00903 
(0.0177) (0.0189)  (0.0165) (0.0177) 
logwL -0.0525*** 0.0118 -0.0714 -0.0515*** 0.0148 -0.0367 
(0.0134) (0.0674) (0.0683) (0.0142) (0.0661) (0.0679) 
logwK 0.111*** 0.988*** 1.071*** 0.113*** 0.985*** 1.037*** 
(0.00971) (0.0674) (0.0683) (0.0104) (0.0661) (0.0679) 
(logwL)2 0.0638*** 0.0641***  0.0614*** 0.0614*** 
(0.00271) (0.00267)  (0.00265) (0.00264) 
(logwK)2 0.0638*** 0.0641***  0.0614*** 0.0614*** 
(0.00271) (0.00267)  (0.00265) (0.00264) 
logwLlogwK -0.0638*** -0.0641***  -0.0614*** -0.0614*** 
(0.00271) (0.00267)  (0.00265) (0.00264) 
logwLlogy -0.0156*** -0.00821*  -0.0144*** -0.00970** 
(0.00405) (0.00431)  (0.00396) (0.00425) 
logwKlogy  0.0156*** 0.00821*  0.0144*** 0.00970** 
(0.00405) (0.00431)  (0.00396) (0.00425) 
s (= RoHS -1.061 11.63*** 11.39*** -0.0584 12.82*** 12.22*** 
or REACH) (0.850) (1.928) (2.041) (0.610) (1.176) (1.257) 
s2 0.295    1.504 
 (1.192)    (1.612) 
s* logwL -0.150***  -0.109*** 
(0.0343)  (0.0381) 
s* logwK 0.150***  0.109*** 
(0.0343)  (0.0381) 
s* logy 0.0792***  0.0619*** 
 (0.0190)  (0.0212) 
Global value 0.222 -2.021*** -2.023*** 0.0432 -2.213*** -2.249*** 
chain (0.155) (0.353) (0.356) (0.114) (0.227) (0.229) 
Malaysia   -1.981*** -1.977***   -1.315*** -1.316*** 
dummy  (0.265) (0.267)   (0.131) (0.132) 
       
Observations 483 483 483 492 492 492 
R-squared 0.964 0.797 0.794 0.964 0.823 0.824 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5. The effect of RoHS and REACH on the variable cost (in percentage) 
These estimates are based on the full sample. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Those for translog II model are evaluated at the mean values of the variables.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Results of export regressions for RoHS (full sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Export entry 
Export entry to 
EU
Number of export 
markets Export amount
Variables Probit Probit Ordered probit Heckman model Selection 
     
Constant -0.793*** -1.414*** 4.463*** 669,450 -0.326*** 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.409) (1.333e+06) (0.103) 
RoHS 0.270 0.413** 0.236* 938,348 0.0827 
 (0.192) (0.174) (0.134) (1.360e+06) (0.173) 
Firm age 0.0160** 0.0179*** 0.00798* 13,067 0.0568*** 
 (0.00653) (0.00575) (0.00431) (53,162) (0.0178) 
wage 8.33e-06 5.21e-06 2.38e-06 71.23* 1.32e-05 
 (1.13e-05) (4.72e-06) (3.00e-06) (37.75) (1.12e-05) 
employment 0.000393* 0.000227** 0.000228*** 527.8 0.000557** 
 (0.000230) (9.99e-05) (6.45e-05) (457.4) (0.000270) 
MNE 0.655*** 0.104 0.293*** 5.102e+06*** 0.611*** 
 (0.173) (0.147) (0.109) (1.745e+06) (0.156) 
Global value  0.627*** 0.377*** 0.526*** 254,245 0.623*** 
chain (0.163) (0.146) (0.115) (1.491e+06) (0.150) 
Malaysia dummy -0.0597 -0.553*** 0.452*** 5.512e+06 -0.0171 
 (0.178) (0.169) (0.129) (3.519e+06) (0.154) 
Years of   -0.0505*** 
production  (0.0185) 
Inverse mills -1.235e+07  
ratio (9.644e+06)  
   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -280.742 -292.153 -952.556 -6,772.11  
Observations 542 547 569 574 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
RoHS REACH 
Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II Cobb-Douglas translog I translog II 
-1.024 12.46*** 11.46** -0.371 12.72*** 11.96 
(0.823) (1.801) (6.20) (0.594) (1.102) (10.42) 

Table 7. Results of export regressions for REACH (full sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Export entry Export entry to EU
Number of export 
markets Export amount  
Variables Probit Probit Ordered probit Heckman model Selection 
      
Constant -0.796*** -1.399*** 4.502*** 558,959 -0.331*** 
(0.197) (0.196) (0.424) (1.494e+06) (0.104) 
REACH 0.657*** 0.449** 0.462*** 2.297e+06 0.411** 
(0.209) (0.181) (0.128) (1.408e+06) (0.195) 
Firm age 0.0150** 0.0166*** 0.00671 7,677 0.0569*** 
(0.00668) (0.00581) (0.00434) (51,291) (0.0178) 
wage 8.99e-06 5.91e-06 2.86e-06 74.81** 1.38e-05 
(1.15e-05) (4.74e-06) (2.90e-06) (37.45) (1.13e-05) 
employment 0.000394* 0.000242** 0.000233*** 570.0 0.000557** 
(0.000231) (9.82e-05) (6.29e-05) (447.5) (0.000274) 
MNE 0.670*** 0.112 0.295*** 5.183e+06*** 0.590*** 
(0.175) (0.147) (0.110) (1.759e+06) (0.157) 
Global value  0.574*** 0.369** 0.487*** 83,780 0.582*** 
chain (0.161) (0.145) (0.112) (1.471e+06) (0.149) 
Malaysia dummy -0.0543 -0.514*** 0.465*** 5.511e+06 -0.0385 
(0.180) (0.169) (0.129) (3.508e+06) (0.154) 
Years of   -0.0514*** 
production  (0.0185) 
Inverse mills  -1.023e+07  
ratio  (1.117e+07)  
    
    
Log 
pseudolikelihood -276.997 -291.911 -948.575 -6,768.89  
Observations 542 547 569 574 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Table 8.  Results of export regressions for RoHS (sub-sample: firms subject to RoHS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Export entry 
Export entry to 
EU
Number of export 
markets Export amount
Variables Probit Probit Ordered probit Heckman model Selection 
     
Constant -0.367 -0.675 4.159*** -1.125e+06 -0.310** 
 (0.517) (0.472) (0.536) (3.617e+06) (0.123) 
RoHS 0.244 0.385** 0.253* 396,558 0.0769 
 (0.200) (0.183) (0.137) (1.557e+06) (0.186) 
Firm age 0.0204*** 0.0214*** 0.0131*** 16,096 0.0689*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00623) (0.00476) (62,172) (0.0176) 
wage 5.46e-06 -3.78e-06 -3.84e-06 201.2 8.06e-06 
 (1.29e-05) (8.76e-06) (7.24e-06) (142.4) (1.29e-05) 
employment 0.000348 0.000176** 0.000202*** 635.2 0.000496* 
 (0.000234) (8.74e-05) (6.42e-05) (492.1) (0.000272) 
MNE 0.583*** 0.0983 0.251** 5.433e+06*** 0.542*** 
 (0.185) (0.156) (0.119) (1.982e+06) (0.169) 
Global value  0.689*** 0.345** 0.535*** 282,412 0.737*** 
chain (0.170) (0.152) (0.121) (1.659e+06) (0.161) 
Malaysia dummy -0.113 -0.432** 0.384** 6.989e+06 -0.174 
 (0.203) (0.195) (0.153) (4.601e+06) (0.177) 
Years of   -0.0583*** 
production  (0.0187) 
Inverse mills -7.868e+6  
ratio (1.258e+7)  
   
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes  
Log 
pseudolikelihood -227.214 -245.821 -782.976 -5,597.47  
Observations 440 443 459 459 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
Table 9. Results of export regressions for REACH (sub-sample: firms subject to  
REACH) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Export entry Export entry to EU
Number of export 
markets Export amount  
Variables Probit Probit Ordered probit Heckman model Selection 
      
Constant -0.249 -0.791* 4.305*** -1.942e+06 -0.328*** 
(0.497) (0.409) (0.509) (3.785e+06) (0.121) 
REACH 0.603*** 0.417** 0.422*** 2.258e+06 0.370* 
(0.222) (0.192) (0.131) (1.605e+06) (0.207) 
Firm age 0.0189*** 0.0188*** 0.0106** 2,872 0.0654*** 
(0.00727) (0.00628) (0.00477) (60,848) (0.0164) 
wage 5.38e-06 -1.26e-06 -2.05e-06 209.6 6.83e-06 
(1.23e-05) (8.69e-06) (6.99e-06) (136.3) (1.17e-05) 
employment 0.000334 0.000195** 0.000208*** 696.5 0.000471* 
(0.000222) (8.67e-05) (6.19e-05) (483.0) (0.000261) 
MNE 0.597*** 0.0875 0.242** 5.330e+06*** 0.545*** 
(0.185) (0.155) (0.119) (1.978e+06) (0.168) 
Global value  0.654*** 0.358** 0.529*** 41,501 0.697*** 
chain (0.166) (0.151) (0.117) (1.695e+06) (0.159) 
Malaysia dummy -0.0723 -0.392** 0.408*** 6.797e+06 -0.162 
(0.201) (0.193) (0.152) (4.568e+06) (0.175) 
Years of   -0.0554*** 
production  -0.328*** 
Inverse mills  -6.785e+06  
ratio  (1.441e+07)  
    
    
Log 
pseudolikelihood -232.092 -248.865 -796.689 -5,672.84  
Observations 450 449 468 468 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
